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Abstract: Land use right transfer (LURT) has been viewed to have significant 
potential in advancing farmland management in China. However, the 
implementation of LURT policy and more specifically its effects on the local 
society and economy is an under-researched area. This paper provides insights 
into the implementation of LURT carried out in the City of Zhangye, Gansu 
Province. Eight villages were visited for this study and data were gathered 
through key informant interviews, statistical datasets and official legal 
documents. Our results reveal the socio-economic performance and 
complicated influence of LURT policy in the region. The promotion of 
farmers’ income was confirmed in some villages and more farmers have been 
involved into non-agricultural sectors. However, not all farmers were satisfied 
with their income and contract management was somehow unsatisfying. For 
future improvement, policy-makers need to better tackle the ambiguous public 
awareness and poor management of LURT contracts. 
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implementation; socio-economic influence. 
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1 Introduction 
The institution of farmland ownership and use rights in China has significantly developed 
over time since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Before the 
1978 economic reform, land ownership and use rights were legally muddled. Although 
previous national constitutions of China positioned farmland as public owned, the 
position of how and by whom the farmland should be used remained legally vague  
(The National People’s Congress, 1954, 1975, 1978). Yields of farmland were also 
considered as public owned, and farmers possessed no incentive to put effort in their 
cultivation. This resulted in numerous cases of land grab and land appropriation and led 
to serious land use inefficiencies (Gu, 2003). During the 1980s, trials of land institution 
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reform were gradually promoted along with the economic reform to activate agricultural 
production. These approaches included allowing farmers to possess their own yields and 
allowing farmland to be contracted. Farmland ownership and use rights were gradually 
distinguished, and land use right transfer (LURT) was eventually defined by law.  
In 1982, the current constitution was ratified wherein it defines for the first time, the 
owners of land as ‘The State’ and ‘collectives’ (The National People’s Congress, 1982). 
Furthermore, through the 1988 Constitutional Amendment, the LURT was first 
recognised (The National People’s Congress, 1988). Therefore, as a result of the 1982 
constitution and 1988 constitutional amendment, land ownership and LURT were legally 
clarified. Since 1990s, after nearly a decade of practice, these land institution reforms 
have been proven to be effective in promoting both agricultural production and rapid 
urbanisation (Jiang et al., 2007). Currently, the ownership of land in China follows a 
dual-track: i.e. state-ownership in urban areas and collective-ownership in rural areas 
(The National People’s Congress, 2004). Regarding collectively owned land in rural 
areas, land use rights are allocated to farmers based on three functions, i.e., housing, 
privately farmed plots and contracted croplands (The National People’s Congress, 2004). 
The tenure of land use rights is determined by these three functions. Land use rights 
for housing and private farming are usually jointly allocated to farmers, for the purpose 
of residence and daily ration cultivation, without any tenure limit. On the other hand, land 
use rights of contracted cropland are allocated to households for the purpose of 
commodity crop cultivation, with an extendable tenure of 30 years (The National 
People’s Congress, 2004). The function of lands can be changed only with governmental 
approval. Based on this premise, the government practices some flexibility on the 
management of rural lands. Housing and privately farmed plots, although collectively 
owned by the local community de jure, are considered by farmers as their individual 
property (Li et al., 1998). Households in some villages even possess the freedom to 
bequeath their housing and privately farmed plot to their children (Brandt et al., 2002). 
With respect to contracted cropland, farmers maintain the option of outsourcing the land 
use right to others - with the premise of keeping the land for purpose of crop cultivation. 
In this case, the land use rights of those farmlands are outsourced, i.e. transferred, as a de 
facto commodity, while the local community is still the subject of the contract de jure. 
Land use right transfer on contracted cropland has been of great significance in 
China’s agricultural economy. On one hand, among the three functions, contracted 
cropland is dominating rural land use, in terms of total area. The latest statistical area of 
contracted cropland was published as 18.26 × 108 mu1 (12,171.59 × 104 hm2) for the 
whole China in 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014)2. Regarding housing 
area, Song et al. (2008) estimated a 1.367 × 108 mu (911.61 × 104 hm2) for the year 2005; 
the Economic Information Daily (2014) said a 1.7 × 108 mu (1,133.34 × 104 hm2) for the 
year 2013, whereas He (2015) suggested a 2.5 × 108 mu (1,666.68 × 104 hm2) for 2014. 
The area of contracted cropland is 7.3 times of the estimation of He (2015) for housing, 
and 29.2 times of privately farmed plot. Therefore, LURT on contracted cropland 
significantly influences rural agricultural production. On the other hand, governments 
attach great importance to LURT policy. Indeed, it was promoted as a strategy for the 
further market liberalisation of the agricultural economy since 2003 (Sixteenth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2003). It has also been expected to increase 
agricultural mechanisation, farmland yields, income of farmers and availability of youth 
labour towards higher value-added economic sectors. The high expectation attached to 
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the LURT policy by the government necessitates the need to investigate the success of its 
implementation and obtain insights into its social and economic affects. 
China’s land use right issue has been a controversial topic that has attracted the 
attention of many researchers. Numerous research publications have been concerned with 
the land use right system and its institutional change (Brandt et al., 2002; Ho and Lin, 
2003; Ding, 2003, 2007; Zhu, 2004). Several researchers have focused on the impact of 
land institutions on land use efficiency from various perspectives (Li et al., 1998; Carter 
and Yao, 2002). The land tenure security issue, based on the current property right 
system, has also received the attention of researchers (Li et al., 1998; Kung, 2000; 
Krusekopf, 2002). Other researches have focused on specific related topics. For example, 
Liu et al. (1998) discuss the internal conflict of interests between stakeholders, including 
owners, contractors, cultivators and governors. Specific to LURT, Du and Sun (2011) 
presents an empirical discussion on LURT institutions, and Liu (2012) focuses on the 
positions of the LURT institutions vis-a-vis the ‘New Countryside Construction’ national 
policy program. Nevertheless, there is a gap in the literature providing insights into the 
implementation of LURT policies and their socio-economic effects based on case studies. 
With the aim of contributing in this area, this paper examines the implementation of 
LURT policies in Gaotai County, Zhangye City, in northwest China. This paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the study area and data collection 
methodology for this research. Section 3 introduces the implementation of LURT policies 
at Gaotai County and analyses the corresponding socio-economic effects. A discussion 
and concluding thoughts on the advantages and disadvantages of LURT policy are 
followed in Section 4. 
2 Materials and methods 
2.1 Study area 
Zhangye City, located in the middle reaches of the Heihe River basin, is the second 
largest inland river basin in China (Figure 1a). The city holds jurisdiction over 60 towns 
consisting of 835 administrative villages, which further contains 5,965 ‘Villager Groups’, 
or ‘Production Teams’ as its previous name, as the basic unit for administration and 
agricultural production in rural China (Wang, 2014). In total, 741.9 thousand citizens in 
271.4 thousand households serve as the agricultural population in this area (Wang, 2014; 
Li, 2014). Despite being close to the third biggest desert in China, i.e. the Badain Jaran 
Desert, Zhangye benefits from the Heihe River and is dependent on its agriculture sector. 
Zhangye is a major producer of seed corn in China, with a yield of 32.2 × 104 tons in 
2014 - this counts as 32% of China’s total seed corn production (Zhangye Agricultural 
Bureau, 2015). In 2011, the primary sector contributed 28.1% to the total GDP in 
Zhangye City (Xian, 2013). 
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Figure 1 (a) Location of Heihe River basin and Zhangye city within China. (b) Detailed map of 
Gaotai County in the middle reaches of Heihe River basin 
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The local government of Zhangye has been largely promoting LURT since 2009  
(Li, 2014). In 2014, the land use right of 26.3% of the total farmland in Zhangye was 
transferred, i.e., 1.023 million mu (6.82 × 104 hm2) out of the total 3.89 million mu (25.93 
× 104 hm2) of arable land. This amounted to approximately 670% more LURT than 2007 
(Wang, 2014). Given the strong promotion by the local government and test pilot position 
as a large-scale LURT policy, the City of Zhangye proved to be an ideal case study for 
this research. As a traditional oasis agriculture-based city, Zhangye shares quite a few 
commonalities, in terms of climate, natural environment, urbanisation process and 
ecological threshold, with other cities located in the semi-arid regions of China and the 
Hexi Corridor (Qiao et al., 2006). Therefore, the case study of Zhangye provides insight 
into LURT policy implementation which will also serve as a good reference to other 
cities under similar conditions in China. 
Gaotai County, located in the west of Zhangye (Figure 1b), is a predominantly rural 
and agriculture-dependent county, with an 82% rural population and a 40% GDP from 
primary sector in 2007 (Du, 2012). The total arable land area in Gaotai County was 58.91 
× 104 mu (3.93 × 104 hm2) in 2014, from which the land use right of 8.6 × 104 mu (5.73 × 
103 hm2) had been transferred (Li, 2014). Figure 1b illustrates the map of villages that 
have been visited in the field survey. Eight villages scattering in three towns were 
involved. They are expressed as XF Village, ZH Village and XHZ Village at NH Town; 
QJ Village, HX Village and JK Village at LTC Town; and XH Village and ZJP Village at 
XH Town. They all contained certain degree of LURT. 
2.2 Data collection 
Data for this research were collected using a triangulation analysis of key informant 
interviews, statistical data and legal documents. Data triangulation enabled the validation 
of results and evidence building for this research (Hennink et al., 2010). Data collection 
was mainly conducted during a field survey at Gaotai County from August 3 to August 
13, 2014. Key informant and villagers’ interviews served as core methodology in the 
field survey. A total number of 20 in-depth interviews were conducted, including 10 
farmers as lessors, 3 governmental officials, 2 ‘Villager Group’ leaders, 1 cooperative 
operator, 2 private agricultural company managers and 2 farmers as individual sub-
contractors. All the interviews were semi-structured with some bundles of common 
questions yet an unconstrained format and more individualised questions. The question 
bundles involve various aspects, including, but not limited to, management of LURT 
practice; support from the government; the family’s labour situation and attitudes towards 
LURT policies; farmers’ hourly wage; and the target market for production and annual 
income and expenses. Besides the interview survey, a number of raw statistical data as 
well as legal documents from the local government were collected. 
3 Results 
3.1 How is LURT policy implemented at Gaotai County? 
According to Zhangye Statistics Bureau, the five major LURT modes (Table 1) in the 
Zhangye include the leasing mode, outsourcing mode, exchange mode, stake sharing 
mode and commission mode (Wang, 2014). Leasing mode refers to the transfer of land 
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between farmers and local production cooperatives (Or co-ops: self-organised indigenous 
agribusiness firms), and major farmland holding families (dahu families). Outsourcing 
mode refers to land transfer from farmers to other third-party companies. Exchange mode 
refers to exchange of land among farmers for the convenience of cultivation. Stake 
sharing mode refers to land use rights to be utilised as a ‘stake’ in joint management and 
profit. Finally, commission mode refers to the commissioning of land use right by 
farmers to friends, due to their inability to cultivate the land by themselves, without the 
demand of any profit. 
Table 1 LURT transfer modes (Grey shows transfer modes identified in this study) 
Land use right 
transfer mode 
Transfer objectives  
(sub-contractors) Description 
Leasing mode hezuoshe (cooperative, self-
organised indigenous 
agribusiness firm) or dahu 
(rich families) 
Mainly local sub-contractor 
Outsourcing mode Third-party companies Mainly non-local sub-contractor 
Exchange mode Other farmers For the sake of cultivation convenience 
(land consistency) 
Stake sharing mode hezuoshe or third-party 
companies 
The use right of land is utilised as ‘stake’ 
for a joint management and profit 
Commission mode Friends (farmers) Farmers commission their land use right 
to friends due to an inability of 
cultivating by themselves without asking 
for any profit 
In our field survey, only two transfer modes mentioned above were found. Five 
cooperatives and five farmers belonging to dahu families in our interview were practicing 
the leasing mode to sub-contractors. Furthermore, LURT to five private companies under 
the outsourcing mode was also observed. According to Wang (2014), the leasing and 
outsourcing modes, in terms of area transferred, accounted, respectively, for 75.3% and 
13.3% share of total LURT. The findings of our survey also correspond to the above 
proportion and indicate leasing and outsourcing as the major modes among LURT. 
The detailed list of total farmland areas and number of households involved in LURT 
among the villages of the NH Town from year 2011 to 2013 is provided in Table 2. 
Similarly, Table 3 shows the information at the LTC Town since year 2009 up to the year 
2014. From 2011 to 2013, NH Town transferred 1.36 × 104 mu3 out of the total 
approximate 3.49 × 104 mu cultivated farmland (Gansu Rural Yearbook Committee, 
2010). Since 2014, NH Town has been promoting the development of vegetable 
cultivation by making the transferred land into a ‘Vegetable industry park’. From 2011 to 
2013, the area of transferred farmland in each year at NH town shrank slightly year by 
year. The decreasing trend may be attributed to the decreasing availability of land for 
LURT as more and more land has been previously transferred. On the other hand, the 
area of transferred land at LTC Town stood at 1.36 × 104 mu out of a total 6 × 104 mu 
until the year 2014, with more farmland being transferred in 2014 than the sum of all the 
years before. Moreover, transferred land at XH Town reached 1.03 × 104 mu, out of its 
total 3.52 × 104 mu farmland, which also shows a booming trend. Overall, the statistical 
evidence indicates a general boom of LURT market in recent years. 
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Table 2 Area and households involved in LURT at NH Town (2011–2013) (Area unit: mu) 
Village 
LURT 
area 
(2011–
2013) 
LURT 
area 
(2011) 
Households 
involved 
(2011) 
Farmer’s 
population 
involved 
(2011) 
LURT 
area 
(2012) 
Households 
involved 
(2012) 
Farmer’s 
population 
involved 
(2012) 
LURT 
area 
(2013)
Households 
involved 
(2013) 
Farmer’s 
population 
involved 
(2013) 
XHZ 3,874.52 2,622.52 130 494 1,252 86 403  – – 
DR 1,370.18 1,295.18 74 323 75 43 198  – – 
DZ 830    170 15 70 660 – – 
NZZ 1,246.2 600 78 230 558.2 42 198 88 – – 
YH 1,015.9 614.9 74 290    401 – – 
ZH 515    515 42 198  – – 
LH 3,316.59    3,316.59 243 925  – – 
NC 506 506 109 429     – – 
XIH 450       450 –– – 
CH 1,212.9 1,212.9 60 231     – – 
MS 203.8 203.8 22 90     – – 
MY 174.11    174.11 9 45  – – 
YJ 189.65 89.65 11 50 100 8 35  – – 
Total 14,904.85a 7,144.95 558 2,137 6,160.9 488 2,072 1,599 – – 
aThis number is an accumulative sum from year 2011 to 2013 instead of actual total area 
that carried out LURT at the end of 2013 
Table 3 Area and households involved in LURT at LTC town (Area unit: mu) 
Village 
LURT 
area  
(–2014) 
LURT 
area 
(–
2013) 
Households 
involved  
(–2013) 
Farmer’s 
population 
involved 
(–2013) 
LURT 
area 
(2014) 
Households 
involved 
(2014) 
Farmer’s 
population 
involved 
(2014) 
JQZ 1,859.1 1,600 – – 259.1 17 64 
WT 499  – – 499 38 112 
XL 357  – – 357 4 11 
HX 2,630  – –– 2,630 143 506 
TJ 540 240 – –– 300 1 3 
JK 1,950 770 – – 1,180 50 180 
YS 420  – – 420 16 57 
QJ 4,414 2,000 – – 2,414 36 98 
XJ 500  – – 500 3 10 
XT 400 400 – –  30 126 
Total 13,569.1 5,010 – – 8,559.1 338 1,167 
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3.2 How is LURT contract operated at Gaotai County? 
The level of government involvement with the LURT can be categorised as either Type A 
direct involvement or Type B indirect involvement. The stakeholders and flows of these 
two contract categories are illustrated in Figure 2. In Type A contracts, farmers 
participating in LURT will approach the Village Committee who will subsequently 
represent farmers in leasing land to contractors. In this case, farmers usually are not 
aware of the identity of the contractors before their land use rights are transferred. In 
Type B contracts, the government indirectly assists farmers to sign contract with 
contractors. Furthermore, in Type B contracts, the government provides judicial and 
arbitration services, and assists the settlement of disputes between the signing parties. In 
our field survey, we found that NH Town and XH Town followed Type A contracts, 
whereas LTC Town followed Type B contracts. 
Figure 2 LURT contract types 
 
Among the two types of contracts discussed above, various contract terms were observed. 
These terms and their corresponding contract types are summarised in Table 4. In our 
survey, we observed four cases from NH Town where 30-year contract terms were 
practiced. In one case at XF Village, NH Town, the land use right was allocated to one 
farmer at 1995 by the village with a 30-year tenure. In 2013, this farmer signed an LURT 
contract with another 30-year term. The contract term actually exceeded the tenure of 
land use right which will be due on 2025. For the sake of its legal validation therefore, 
the contract term was divided into two parts. The first part was a 12-year period, from 
2013 to 2025, and the second part was an 18-year period, from 2025 to 2043. The second 
part of the contract will automatically come into effect when the farmer’s 30-year land 
use rights are extended by the government in 2025. Shorter contract terms, on the other 
hand, i.e., from 1 to 5 years, were also observed in NH Town. In XH Town, 3-year 
contract terms were the practiced norm, whereas no contracts exceeding a 6-year term 
were observed in LTC Town. 
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Table 4 LURT contract modes, terms and corresponding cases 
Contract mode Description Contract term Cases 
Mode A. Government directly 
involved in contract 
endorsement as a party 
30 years XF Vil. (NH Town) 
ZH Vil. (NH Town) 
3–5 years XF Vil. (NH Town) 
XHZ Vil. (NH Town) 
ZH Vil. (NH Town) 
CH Vil. (NH Town) 
Less than 3 
years 
LH Vil. (NH Town) 
XIH Vil. (NH Town) All 
villages throughout XH Town 
Mode B. Government indirectly 
assisted other parties in 
contract endorsement 
3–6 years HX Vil. (LTC Town) 
QJ Vil. (LTC Town) 
QJ Vil. (LTC Town) 
JQZ Vil. (LTC Town) 
Less than 3 
years 
HX Vil. (LTC Town) 
JK Vil. (LTC Town) 
Figure 3 shows the schematic diagram of the four major business models being practiced 
in the study area. In the first model, farmers outsourcing their land use rights to 
companies are subsequently employed by the same companies to work on those 
farmlands. In the second model, after receiving LURT from farmers, companies sub-
contract the use rights to ‘dahu families’ whom employ farmers to work on the lands. | 
In third and fourth models, the farmers outsource their land use rights to, respectively, 
‘dahu families’ and cooperatives. 
Figure 3 A schematic diagram of four major business models in LURT practice 
 
Despite the different contracts models, it was commonly observed that most farmers,  
5 out of 11 of farmers interviewed, would eventually work on their own or nearby 
farmlands. Ironically, these contracts would only change the position of farmers, from 
land use right holders to employees of the sub-contractors, while still tying them to the 
land. The only difference between the first, third and fourth contract models is the sub-
contractor and farmers are directly employed. In the second model, as a result of the 
labour shortage, land cultivation is outsourced to dahu families. In the second model, the 
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company plays the role of manager, marketer and quality controller, and is not directly 
involved in the cultivation process. 
3.3 How does LURT policy affect sustainable agriculture and crop structure? 
For a more resilient human-environmental coupled system, sustainable agricultural 
practices emphasise the necessity for higher crop diversity. While the region enjoys high 
levels of seed-diversity, the potentials for high crop diversity have been limited due to the 
structure of the market. The agricultural market of the areas we surveyed is heavily 
influenced by fertility, geographical fragmentation of the farmland and existing supply-
demand networks. In general, it was observed that both higher LURT activity and land 
rent were correlated with the larger farmlands and crop yield fertility conditions. This 
was best seen while comparing the effect of LURT policy between NH and LTC town, 
whereby the first has lower average levels of farmland per household (Table 2), crop 
yield, lower rent (Table 5) and lower LURT activities. 
Table 5 Rent of transferred land at LTC Town and NH Town 
Village  
(LTC Town) 
Rent  
(RMByuan/muꞏyr) 
Village  
(NH Town) 
Rent 
(RMByuan/muꞏyr) 
JQZ 950 XHZ 600, 700 
WT 850 DR 500–700 
XL 700 DZ 400–800 
HX 800 NZZ 500, 800 
TJ 700 YH 700, 800 
JK 1,000 ZH 800 
YS 1,000 LH 675.5, 700 
QJ 700 NC 500 
XJ 650 XIH 800 
XT 1,100 CH 700 
  MS 500 
  MY 900 
  YJ 500–800 
Range 650–1,100 Range 400–900 
What is certain is that despite the limitations of available land, LURT policy should take 
a stronger approach in promoting a more entrepreneurial agricultural market. Although 
seed and edible corns are dominant in the cultivation structure, as can be seen in Tables 6 
and 7, there is substantial diversity in the selection of other crops. The selection of crops, 
however, is heavily influenced by pre-existing market channels. Pre-existing market 
channels are beneficial in lowering transactions costs; however, for incoming stability, 
individual farmers tend to not switch and experiment with new crops. Nevertheless, our 
results reveal more flexibility by cooperatives and companies to switch crop structures 
and tune their activities to benefit from new market opportunities. Contract farming also 
significantly influenced the selection of crops. Contract farming is a type of farming 
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whereby farmers reach agreements on the selection of crops with the crop merchants. The 
effects of pre-existing market channels were most notably seen through the practice of 
contract farming. In our surveys, contract farming was seen among the activities of onion 
merchants and contracts with ketchup-producing factories. 
Table 6 Cropping structure on transferred land 
Village Town 
Vegetation 
Seed 
corn
Edible 
corn Wheat Cabbage
Chinese 
cabbage Tomato Cauliflower Sunflower Radish Onion Chili 
XF NH √ √         √ 
ZH NH    √ √  √  √   
XHZ NH  √    √  √ √ √  
SL NH √ √ √     √ √   
QJ LTC  √        √  
JK LTC  √        √  
HX LTC √           
XH XH        √    
ZJP XH      √    √ √ 
Table 7 Cropping structure and cultivated area on transferred land at LTC Town (area unit: 
mu) 
Village 
LURT area 
(–2014) 
Cultivated area at transferred land (2014) 
Seed corn Edible corn Onion Sunflower 
JQZ 1,859.1  1,859.1   
WT 499   499  
XL 357  250 107  
HX 2,630 2,630    
TJ 540  300 240  
JK 1,950  770 1,180  
YS 420   420  
QJ 4,414  3,414 1,000  
XJ 500    500 
XT 400   400  
Total 13,569.1 2,630 6,593.1 3,846 500 
The ability to develop a more entrepreneurial agricultural market through LURT policy 
was also significantly influenced by individual incentives. As seen in Tables 8 and 9, the 
attitudes of farmers are based on their age and ability to work. Specifically, we observed 
that a majority of farmers who were in good health believed that self-cultivation provided 
higher incomes than LURT contracts, whereas farmers with low health had opposite 
attitudes. An important factor in shaping these attitudes is that most LURT contracts 
require farmers to bear the costs of maintaining irrigation wells and therefore forego 
more of their actual profits. Overall, the priority of all farmers was observed to lie in 
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finding employment opportunities in urban areas, where they could earn higher salaries. 
Hence, on one hand, LURT policy was viewed as liberating labour mobility and 
providing an opportunity for work elsewhere without completely wasting their farmland. 
However, on the other hand, LURT policy has been less successful in promoting a more 
diverse agricultural market with ample individual incentives for entrepreneurial activities. 
Table 8 Public participation and attitude towards LURT practice (Interview data only) 
Participation 
basis Town Village 
Farmers 
Local 
cadres dahu Stakeholders 
Pro Ambiguous Con Lobbied Pro Con Pro Neutral Con Attitude 
Villager 
group 
(Production 
team) 
NH XF  3  3 1     Number of 
people ZH   2 1 2   1  
XHZ         1 
XH XH   1 1      
ZJP 1         
Individual 
household 
LTC QJ 1         
JK   2 1      
HX  1        
Table 9 Attitude towards LURT and reasons based on age groups and household situation 
Major household 
members age group Household situation 
Willingness 
to land 
transfer Reasons 
Elder (People in their 
late 40s or beyond) 
Healthy enough for 
agricultural work 
Not willing 
to 
More income if land is cultivated 
by themselves; 
Too old to work in non-
agricultural sectors 
Too weak to do 
agricultural work 
Willing to Cannot cultivate even without 
land transfer; 
Too old to work in non-
agricultural sectors 
Youth and middle-
aged (People in their 
20s, 30s and early 
40s) 
Supporting 
elders or 
kids in 
family 
Elders 
healthy 
enough 
Not Willing 
to 
More income if land is cultivated 
by elders; 
Youth could work in non-
agricultural sectors; 
Elders could take care of kids 
  Elders 
not 
healthy 
enough 
Willing to Youth is able to work in non-
agricultural sectors; 
Elders can’t cultivate even 
without land transfer; 
Elders could take care of kids and 
get land rent at the same time 
 No need for 
supporting elders or 
kids in family 
Willing to Youth is able to work in non-
agricultural sectors; 
Could get land rent at the same 
time 
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4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the social and economic issues and challenges surrounding 
the Chinese LURT policy through the case of the Zhangye City. The booming LURT 
contracts in the City of Zhangye have had mixed results for the local society. Several 
benefits have been developed due to LURT, including efficiency improvement in 
agriculture production (Jiang et al., 2007), labour liberation and the promotion of grass-
roots democracy. 
First, concerning improvement in agriculture production, LURT is indeed considered 
as an efficient means of land resource redistribution (Wang, 2014). China’s previously 
completely centralised land administrative institutions have been criticised as defective 
by many scholars (Carter and Yao, 2002; Zhu, 2004). In comparison to previous 
institutions, LURT policy has made major inroads in the introduction of market-based 
mechanisms in land administration. First, comparing to cultivation by scattered farmers, 
LURT policy allows farmlands to be managed in larger scales by companies with 
technical know-how and investable capital. Machines together with better planting 
technique are encouraged, which improves level of mechanisation and efficiency. As a 
result, the rural land market and agriculture production become more activated. 
Second, with regard to labour liberation, LURT policy has undoubtedly boosted the 
migration of labour from rural to urban areas as well as from agricultural to non-
agricultural economic sectors. Farmers believe that working in non-agricultural sectors 
provides higher income than in agricultural sectors and LURT offered them the 
opportunity to do so without wasting their farmland. Between 2007 and 2011, the 
population in Gaotai County working in the agricultural sectors has dropped 5.3%  
(Du, 2012) - this indicates a positive trend in labour migration to urban areas. 
Third, LURT promotes the practice of grass-root democracy. Apparently, lobbying 
from village leaders left a strong mark on farmers’ decision (Table 8), for example, 6 out 
of 11 farmers reported that they had been lobbied. However, the decision-making 
procedure was still transparent and compliant with laws and regulations. Farmers 
followed the simple principle of “Minority goes subordinate to majority”, which 
undoubtedly manifested a democratic spirit at grass-root level in a certain sense. 
One case is worthy of mentioning in terms of creating a more entrepreneurial 
agricultural market due to the existence of LURT. Through our investigation, we found 
out a cooperative at HX Village, LTC Town. Named after TFWK, this cooperative 
followed Model 2 (Figure 3) in its business running. The originality of this cooperative is 
that it introduced many new tactics for the traditional agricultural production. By hiring 
specialists for professional field management and precise irrigation, the co-op produces 
pesticide-free high-quality vegetables. Moreover, it developed its marketing channel 
through online advertising and shopping, and it also provided agriculture experiencing 
service for urban citizens. The high value-added products and novel marketing channel is 
believed to bring about more opportunities to an emerging market. The success of this 
case partly demonstrates LURT is capable to encourage a more dynamic and 
entrepreneurial agricultural market. 
In spite of the advantages from booming LURT in the City of Zhangye, certain 
disadvantages of present LURT do exist. They include drawbacks in terms of LURT 
contract management, economic performance and public participation. First, regarding 
LURT contract management, special concern has been exhibited by villagers particularly 
towards the 30-year term contract. This concern is reasonable because such a long 
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duration makes it easier for farmers to lose their control over the farmland. To avoid such 
a problem, a more standardised LURT contract management is required. 
Second, in terms of economic performance, one commonly observed pattern has been 
a positive correlation between longer contract terms and lower annual rents.  
This indicates the presence of a buyer’s market in the long-term LURT business. The 
disparity of the LURT rent price between short- and long-term contracts demonstrates the 
over-supply of long-term LURT contracts. On one hand, farmers earn less and also 
abstain from increases in land value with longer contract terms. The other aspect worthy 
of attention is the common un-satisfaction with the rents, from both farmers and 
contractors. Despite the fact that everybody prefers higher incomes, this un-satisfaction 
reflects that the prevailing low profit margins the agriculture sector as a whole. Third, as 
for public participation, many cases of LURT in this area were largely promoted by 
proactive local village leaders through intensive lobbying. Corresponding well to the 
customary top-down approach in China’s administrative system, this phenomenon 
indicates the partial disregard for the demand of minority for the sake of the majority. 
Through diverse contract modes, LURT is gaining its popularity in Zhangye City. 
Our survey results indicate the inner complexity of LURT system, with the core issue 
based on economic challenges. The future success of LURT requires more input on 
contract supervision, technical support from local authorities, increasing public 
awareness, protection of farmer’s rights and the creation of a more profitable agricultural 
sector. In view of the similar conditions between the City of Zhangye and other cities 
located in Hexi Corridor, this study may serve as reference for furthering research on the 
socio-economic effect of LURT policy in the region. 
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2 The only published data found on privately farmed plots estimates the 2002 per 
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3 Calculated from NH Town local government data. This figure stands for net LURT 
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